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Mount Lebanon and Greece: Mediterranean Crosscurrents, 1821-18411 
 
 
In November 1821, when the Greek rebellion was some months old, Percy Bysshe Shelley, in 
Pisa, dedicated his verse drama Hellas to the Greek leader Alexandros Mavrokordatos. The 
poem presents Sultan Mahmud II sitting in Istanbul as the Ottoman empire crumbles around 
him. Emissaries have already brought news of rebellion in the Danubian provinces, the 





         THIRD MESSENGER. 
    The Christian tribes 
Of Lebanon and the Syrian wilderness 
Are in revolt; – Damascus, Hems, Aleppo, 
Tremble; – the Arab menaces Medina; 
The Ethiop has intrench’d himself in Sennaar, 
And keeps the Egyptian rebel well employ’d, 
Who denies homage, demands investiture 
As price of tardy aid. Persia demands 
The cities on the Tigris, and the Georgians 
Refuse their living tribute. Crete and Cyprus, 
Like mountain-twins that from each other’s veins 
Catch the volcano-fire and earthquake-spasm, 
Shake in the general fever.2 
 
Shelley’s vision was expansive, but it was also quite well-researched: the Ottoman Empire 
had indeed recently faced troubles in all these places, except perhaps Georgia – and the 
powerful governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali, was heavily engaged in Sudan (Sennar).3 This 
article will focus, though, on the instance Shelley begins with: ‘The Christian tribes / Of 
Lebanon’. As it happened, some of them were ‘in revolt’ in 1821, though Shelley may not 
have known of it. 
 
 
1 My thanks to Antonis Leontiou for his invaluable assistance in locating and translating Greek sources; to 
Joanna Innes and Aggelis Zarakostas for their comments on drafts of this article; and to Yanni Kotsonis, 
Maurizio Isabella, Andrew Arsan, and other participants in the Greek Revolution workshop of 2018 at NYU 
London, for their helpful suggestions. 
2 Percy Bysshe Shelley, Hellas: A Lyrical Drama (London: Charles and James Ollier, 1822), 29-30. 
3 Khaled Fahmy, ‘The era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, 1805-1848’, in M. W. Daly, ed, The Cambridge History of 
Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2: 144 (Medina), 153-4. The Ottomans were at war with 
the Qajars (Persia) from 1821-1823; the Russians had suppressed a Georgian rebellion near the Ottoman 
border in 1820, and Shelley may possibly have had this in mind: Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Imperial Policies and 
Perspectives towards Georgia, 1760–1819 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 140. The Greek rebellion had 
of course triggered risings in Crete and Cyprus: Thomas W. Gallant, The Edinburgh History of the Greeks: 1768 
to 1913, the Long Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 264 (ebook). A more 
recent (still better-researched) account of the events around 1821 from the perspective of Mahmud II and 
Istanbul is that of H. Ṣükrü Ilicak, ‘A Radical Rethinking of Empire: Ottoman State and Society during the Greek 
War of Independence (1821-1826)’, PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 2012. 
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The crosscurrents between Mount Lebanon and Greece in and around 1821 have been 
studied largely from the Greek point of view, in the pioneering work of Greek historian 
Emmanouil Protopsaltis in the 1950s, followed up by Spyros Loukatos in the 1970s; 
historians of Lebanon have noted them only in passing.4 They included reprisals in the wake 
of the Greek revolt, corsairing along the coast, and even an attempt at spreading the 
dynamic of the Greek revolt to this other partially Christian province. While the ‘general 
fever’ failed to transmit itself to Mount Lebanon in the 1820s, some of its symptoms are 
discernible there from 1840 onwards, as a more sectarian politics asserted itself in a 
changed Mediterranean context. 
 
 
The Mountain and the sea 
 
The mountains of Lebanon climb steeply from the Mediterranean, behind the coastal strip 
which contains, from north to south, the cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Acre. At the start 
of 1821 the territory known as Mount Lebanon was under the domination of Bashir al-
Shihabi, who had ruled it as Emir for most of the period since 1788, and would continue to 
do so for most of the period until 1840. Emir Bashir was formally a tax-farmer under the 
Ottoman governor of Sidon, but like many provincial notables enjoyed considerable 
autonomy in a period of Ottoman ‘decentralisation’.5 He was aided by the fact that the 
government of the Mountain was considered hereditary in his family, the Shihabis. But any 
adult male of the family could theoretically become Emir, and his position depended on 
balancing the demands for tax revenue of both Ottoman governors and the rest of Mount 
Lebanon’s elite. They too held hereditary family tax-farms, under the Emir; factional intrigue 
was rife, often resulting in murder and armed conflict.6 
 
The south of Mount Lebanon was dominated by the Druze community, adherents of an 
offshoot of Shia Islam who formed the old elite of the area, and the north by Maronite 
Christians, whose importance was on the increase. One sign of this was the quasi-secret 
conversion of Emir Bashir – whose family were traditionally Sunni Muslims – to Catholicism.7 
The Maronite Church cultivated its links with the Church of Rome and the French monarchy, 
which it traced back to the Crusades, and made much of its status as a ‘rose among thorns’, 
surrounded by enemies and heretics.8 The Mountain, despite its distinctiveness, had a close 
relationship with the cities of the Syrian coast, as well as Damascus inland – they were 
crucial for the export of its produce, especially silk, and the import of food. These cities were 
 
4 Emmanouil Protopsaltis, ‘Αυθαίρετος Επιδρομή Ελλήνων κατά του Λιβάνου (1826)’, Αθηνά 58 (1954), 243-
277 (hereafter: Protopsaltis), including many documents from the Greek National Archives. Spyros Loukatos, 
‘Προσπάθειαι Ελληνο-Συρολιβανικής Συμμαχίας κατά των Τούρκων κατά την Ελλήνικήν Επανάστασιν (1822-
1828)’, Μνημοσύνη 3 (1970-1971), 328-394 (hereafter: Loukatos), including additional documents. 
5 See Suraiya Faroqhi, ed, The Cambridge History of Turkey. Vol. 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Part 3: The Centre and the Provinces, 133-206. 
6 Mīkhāʼīl Mishāqa, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder: The History of the Lebanon in the 18th and 19th 
Centuries by Mikhayil Mishaqa (1800-1873), trans. Wheeler N. Thackston Jr. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), 1-
104. 
7 Iliya Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1968), 155–56, 211–12. 




under the direct control of Ottoman governors, of whom the most powerful was the 
governor of Sidon, who actually resided in the fortress of Acre. As well as Sunni and Shia 
Muslims, the coastal cities contained wealthy communities of Christians, especially Greek 
Orthodox and Greek Catholic – as well as some European merchants. Ships plied between 
the coastal ports, Egypt, and Cyprus, as well as Anatolia, the Greek islands, and further west. 
9  
 
The sea had played an important part in Mount Lebanon’s politics. Its ruler in the 1610s, the 
Druze chieftain Fakhr al-Din ibn Ma‘n, had sailed to Tuscany to take refuge with his allies, 
the Medici Grand Dukes.10 In the 1770s, Count Orlov’s Russian fleet cruised the eastern 
Mediterranean trying to draw Greeks into rebellion against the Ottomans, and briefly seized 
Beirut; Mount Lebanon’s Emir, Yusuf al-Shihabi, fleetingly pledged allegiance to the Russian 
Empire.11 In 1799-1800, Emir Bashir himself had sailed on the British ships of Sir Sidney 
Smith, then opposing Napoleon’s forces in Egypt.12 In 1840, he would leave on another 
British warship, for exile in Malta. And in 1821, as we shall see, he was in touch with events 
brewing across the Black Sea in Odessa. 
 
 
Risings in the Mountain 
 
The Lebanese ‘revolt’ of that year, though, had other roots. In March 1821, Maronite 
Christian commoners in northern Mount Lebanon gathered in arms and swore to resist the 
excessive tax demands made of them by Emir Bashir – who was himself responding to 
demands from Abdallah Pasha, the new young governor of Sidon. The commoners resented 
especially having to pay more than the Druze of the southern Mountain.13 They threw their 
support behind Emir Bashir’s rivals for the emirate, and forced him into a brief exile in the 
Hawran in inner Syria. In the summer he returned to broker a compromise with leaders of 
the league and other members of the Mountain’s multi-religious elite. But he encountered 
further resistance from commoners in the northern part of his domain, who formed a 
second league based at the village of Lihfid in September. This Emir Bashir soon crushed, 
with help from his Druze ally Bashir Jumblat.14 
 
 
9 Dominique Chevallier, La société du Mont Liban à l’époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe (Paris: Paul 
Geuthner, 1971), 42-44, 81, 119; William R. Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840: A Study of the 
Impact of the West on the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), chs. 3, 5; Daniel 
Panzac, ‘Commerce et commerçants des ports du Liban Sud et de Palestine (1756-1787)’, Revue des mondes 
musulmans et de la Méditerranée 55, no. 1 (1990): 75–93; Journal du mouvement du Port de Seyde, 10 
November to 21 December 1814, Archives diplomatiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères, La Courneuve 
(AE) 306CCC/26; Tableau des vaisseaux de toutes grandeurs qui sont restés ou qui ont relachés à Seyde 
pendant l'année 1816, AE 306CCC/27. 
10 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Khālidī al-Ṣafadī, Lubnān fī ʻahd al-Amīr Fakhr al-Dīn Maʻnī al-thānī (Beirut: al-
Jāmiʻa al-Lubnāniyya, 1969), 208-41. 
11 Paul du Quenoy, ‘The Russian Occupation of Beirut, 1773–1774’, Russian History 41, no. 2 (2014): 128–41. 
12 Shaykh Sallūm al-Daḥdāḥ, ‘Riḥlat al-Amīr Bashīr al-ūlā ilā Miṣr’, al-Mashriq 18 (1920): 686–899. 
13, 4-5, 9-10. 
14 Peter Hill, ‘How Global Was the Age of Revolutions? The Case of Mount Lebanon, 1821’, Journal of Global 
History (ahead of print, 2020), 4-5, 9-10; Aubin to Martin, 12 September and 1 October 1821, Centre des 
Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN) 633PO/1/86. 
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As I have argued elsewhere, this rising of Christian commoners – partly led by members of 
their Maronite Catholic clergy – originated in similar dynamics to those which lay behind 
other outbreaks of the ‘age of revolutions’ of about 1750-1850, including the Greek 
rebellion.15 The dynamic of competing military-fiscal regimes – including not only empires 
like the Ottoman and Russian but also, in the southeast Mediterranean and the Balkans, 
sub-imperial potentates like Abdallah Pasha of Acre and Ali Pasha of Yannina – led to 
greater demands on populations for revenue and fighting men, while undermining state 
legitimacy. Commoners like those of Lebanon – as well as excluded elites – were 
increasingly driven to define their identity and interests in opposition to the top-down 
politics of military-fiscal extraction. 
 
What the Mount Lebanon risings did not involve, though, was any conscious link or affinity 
with the revolutionary and liberal ideas that circulated through much of the Mediterranean 
and Atlantic world, and played a part – though perhaps an overemphasized one – in other 
revolutions and rebellions. If anything, the leagues’ leaders, as good Catholics, were firmly 
opposed to such revolutionary echoes – one included a strongly Royalist account of the 
French Revolution in his history of Mount Lebanon.16 Nor did the commoner leagues, 
despite their clerical leadership and anti-Druze edge, provoke a sharp polarisation between 
Christian and Muslim (or Druze) in Mount Lebanon politics. Instead, they were absorbed 
into a pattern of cross-confessional alliances among the multireligious elite, in which Emir 
Bashir (guardedly Maronite) depended on Druze allies like Bashir Jumblat, and in which the 
Christian commoners were happy to strike a deal with his rival cousins, who had just 
ostentatiously converted to Islam at the behest of the Ottoman governor.17 The leagues did, 




Repercussions of the Greek rebellion in Syria 
 
The rebellion in the Morea and the Danubian provinces, meanwhile, had provoked a stern 
reaction throughout the Ottoman Empire.18 The execution of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch 
in March 1821 and massacres of Greek Orthodox Christians in Istanbul were accompanied 
by orders to provincial governors to execute dissident Orthodox leaders and to humble 
Christians generally. Exactly how these orders were applied, though, depended on the local 
authorities. The recently-appointed governor of Damascus merely disarmed Christians and 
enforced the old sumptuary laws.19 On the Syrian coast, Abdallah Pasha proceeded to rather 
harsher measures. Many Orthodox Christians were imprisoned, and made to pay huge fines 
– as the French consul reported, ‘in punishment for the revolt of those of Moldavia and 
Wallachia’.20 Those arrested included prominent men such as the Greek Orthodox Bishop of 
 
15 Hill, ‘How Global Was the Age of Revolutions?’, 11-16. 
16 Hill, ‘How Global Was the Age of Revolutions?’, 5-7. 
17 Hill, ‘How Global Was the Age of Revolutions?’, 9-11. 
18 See Ilicak, ‘A Radical Rethinking of Empire’, 130-195. 
19 Mishāqa, Murder, Mayhem, 121; Mīkhā’īl al-Dimashqī, Tārīkh Ḥawādith al-Shām, ed Luwīs Maʿlūf (Beirut: al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Kāthūlīkiyya, 1912), 43. For a similar story at Aleppo, see Strangford to Castlereagh, 18 August and 
25 September 1821 (UK National Archives, FO 78/100 and 101), cited in Theophilus C. Prousis, ‘Rebellion, 
Unrest, Calamity: British Reports on Ottoman Syria in 1821-1823’, Chronos 29 (2014): 188-90. 
20 Martin to de Viella, 15 June 1821, CADN 633PO/1/85. 
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Beirut and two wealthy government secretaries in Tripoli.21 This city had probably the 
largest Orthodox community on the coast: the French consul estimated it at something 
under a quarter of the town’s population. Some of its members, as well as paying their 
fines, sent their money and valuables to monasteries, but the Ottoman authorities went and 
seized them. They auctioned the goods in the town bazaar, ‘despite the lamentable cries of 
a crowd of women, who had been naïve enough to think that they [their possessions] would 
be given back to them’. Some women, as well as men, had been imprisoned and had to be 
ransomed. In general, the French consul wrote, this had led to ‘the ruin of a multitude of 
merchants and artisans.’22 
 
These measures did not always discriminate between Greek Orthodox and other Christians: 
the French consuls frequently complained of their extension to Maronites and Catholics.23 
Many Christians fled to the Mountain, seeking the protection of Emir Bashir. He did not 
always accord it: he reportedly treated the fleeing Orthodox of Tripoli harshly, in order to 
please Abdallah Pasha.24 The possibility that the Christian commoners’ rebellion might 
become bound up with reactions to the Greek war arose in July 1821, when Abdallah tried 
to apply the Sultan’s orders to disarm Orthodox Christians to the Maronites of the 
Mountain. ‘When he wanted to take their arms, as an extension of the firman for the 
disarming of the Greeks,’ the French consul Regnault reported, ‘they told him that they 
would rather give up their women; for without arms, they, their women and their children 
would be devoured by wild beasts, if they were not despoiled, massacred or driven out by 
bands of Arabs [i.e. Bedouin] and Métoualis [Shia Muslims], their neighbours.’25 Regnault 
feared that Abdallah was representing the Maronite commoners as rebels like the Greeks, 
so as to get help from other Ottoman governors in suppressing them. But events did not 
take this turn: the pattern of multiconfessional elite politics held. Even Abdallah’s measures, 
besides, were lenient by contrast to other parts of the empire: there were no wholesale 
massacres or enslavements of Christians. Though Regnault saw Abdallah as a ‘fanatique 
Musulman’, he also suggested that he was mainly interested in taking advantage of the 
imperial displeasure at the Greek Orthodox to extract money from them.26 In these same 
months, Abdallah was in fact imposing fines and forced loans on Jews and Muslims as well 
as Christians.27 Nor were harsh measures against the Orthodox necessarily unwelcome to 
other Christian communities. Regnault initially saw the ruin of Tripoli’s Orthodox merchants 
as a golden opportunity for the French to replace them in commerce, while the humbling of 




Corsairs on the coast 
 
21 Aubin to Martin, 27 May 1821, 633PO/1/86; Regnault to de Rayneval, 29 December 1821, AE 346CCC/17. 
22 Regnault to Latour-Maubourg, 9 February 1822, CADN 92PO/A/6. 
23 Aubin to Martin, 27 and 31 May, 29 June 1821, CADN 633PO/1/86; Regnault to Pasquier, 2 and 15 July, 27 
August 1821, AE 346CCC/17; Regnault to Latour-Maubourg, 9 February 1822, CADN 92PO/A/6. Cf. Mishāqa, 
Murder, Mayhem, 122. 
24 Regnault to Latour-Maubourg, 9 February 1822, CADN 92PO/A/6. 
25 Regnault to Pasquier, 27 July 1821, AE 346CCC/17. 
26 Regnault to Latour-Maubourg, 9 February 1822, CADN 92PO/A/6. 
27 Martin to de Viella, 29 January 1822, CADN 633PO/1/85. 




By the winter of 1821, the Greek rebellion was making its presence felt along the Syrian 
coast in another form: corsairing. The French consul at Beirut had noted reports of corsairs 
off Damietta in Egypt – a lynchpin of trade in the southeast Mediterranean – already in May 
1821.29 Corsairs were also operating further north, intercepting pilgrim ships coming from 
Jaffa in the Holy Land. The American missionary Levi Parsons encountered the Greek vessels 
around Castello Rosso and Rhodes in May, bearing ‘a flag perfectly black, with the exception 
of a white cross in the middle and a red crescent beneath it’.30 In July, headless corpses 
were washed up on the Syrian coast near Tripoli: the French consul suspected they 
belonged to the crew of Ottoman ships that Greek corsairs had captured off Damietta.31 He 
began to report corsairs’ presence along the Syrian coast itself from November 1821.32 They 
were soon regularly intercepting Ottoman shipping, and ‘visiting’ European vessels to seize 
Ottoman-owned goods. Consuls and ships’ captains sometimes tried to bargain with them 
for the return of goods of persons under European protection, but seem rarely to have 
succeeded.33 Commerce was suspended at times, as even European ships were afraid to put 
out to sea.34 
 
The corsairs’ attempts were not uniformly successful: some were driven off by Ottoman 
port defences, or dissuaded by the presence of well-armed European ships.35 Yet they took 
ships not only on the open seas, but often in the coastal anchorages and inside the ports 
themselves, as well as making occasional forays onto land.36 Some of their exploits were 
audacious. In January 1823, a vessel entered the port of Beirut flying a Turkish flag. The 
‘captain of the port’, nothing suspecting, boarded it with seven of his men: it of course 
turned out to be a Greek corsair and promptly carried off the eight officials, taking with it 
another ship from the port loaded with wheat. Corsair and prize calmly anchored in the 
usual place at the mouth of the Beirut river. There was uproar in the town: Orthodox 
Christians and some Europeans were thrown into the gaols, and one young Orthodox man 
was garrotted as he sought refuge in the French consulate. The Muslim populace 
threatened to put all the Christians to death unless the European consuls went to ransom 
the Beiruti Muslim captives. This they did: after some haggling with the corsair captain, they 
 
29 Aubin to Martin, 24 May 1821, CADN 633PO/1/86 (microfilm 2MI 3056). 
30 Levi Parsons, Memoir of Rev. Levi Parsons: First Missionary to Palestine from the United States (Burlington: 
Chauncey Goodrich, 1830), 339-41. 
31 Regnault to Pasquier, 27 July 1821, AE 346CCC/17. 
32 Regnault to de Rayneval, 10 November 1821, AE 346CCC/17. 
33 E.g. Dupont to Montmorency, 15 December 1825, AE 42CCC/1 (microfilm P/10798); Desrivaux to 
Montmorency, 25 March 1823, AE 346CCC/17. The Anglo-Irish physician Madden did rather better when he 
was captured off Tyre in 1827. Largely by getting drunk with the corsair captain, he secured the release of a 
few captives and the partial payment of the English ship captain’s freight charges. Richard Robert Madden, 
Travels in Turkey, Egypt, Nubia, and Palestine, in 1824, 1825, 1826, and 1827 (London: Henry Colburn, 1829), 
2: 385-396. 
34 Dupont to Montmorency, 9 December 1822, AE 42CCC/1; Desrivaux to Montmorency, 1 and 15 February 
1823, AE 346CCC/17. The interruption to local shipping was doubtless greater: see, for the start of 1823, 
Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābī, Lubnān fī ʻahd al-umarāʼ al-Shihābiyyīn: wa-huwa al-juzʼ al-thānī wa-l-thālith min 
Kitāb al-Ghurar al-ḥisān fī akhbār abnāʼ al-zamān, ed. Asad Rustum and Fuʼād Afrām Bustānī (Beirut: al-Jāmiʻa 
al-Lubnāniyya, 1969), 736. 
35 Dupont to Montmorency, 31 December 1822, 12 January 1826, AE 42CCC/1. 
36 Desrivaux to Montmorency, 15 and 28 February 1823; Desrivaux to Chateaubriand, 20 August and 8 
November 1823; Guys to Chateaubriand, 1 April 1824, AE 346CCC/17. 
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returned to Beirut with the eight port officials and were greeted by a joyful crowd, which 
bore them in triumph to the palace.37 As this example shows, corsairs’ assaults, especially 
when they came onto land, had the potential to provoke reprisals against Orthodox and 
other Christians.38 
 
It was about this time that corsairs took a hand in local politics. 1821 had also seen a 
confrontation between Abdallah Pasha of Acre – supported by Emir Bashir – and Mehmed 
Dervish Pasha of Damascus. This led to Abdallah being declared a rebel by the Porte: 
Dervish Pasha, supported by the governors of Aleppo and Adana, besieged him in his 
fortress of Acre from late August 1822. Emir Bashir, meanwhile, sought refuge with 
Mehmed Ali Pasha, the powerful governor of Egypt.39 The siege lasted nearly a year: in 
February 1823 the French consul at Tripoli reported that Greek corsairs were ‘daily’ 
resupplying Acre with food and even some ‘partisans’, helping to prolong the fort’s 
resistance.40 They may have been aiming to divert Ottoman forces from the Greek war: the 
siege of Acre was tying up some thousands of Ottoman troops.41 But their motives are 
perhaps just as likely to have been pecuniary: as the French consul noted, the food and 
tobacco that they took from their prizes would be in demand in the besieged citadel.42 Not 
long after this, Mehmed Ali Pasha interceded with Istanbul for both Abdallah and Emir 
Bashir. Large sums of money changed hands, the Emir returned to Lebanon, and the siege of 
Acre was lifted in May 1823.43 
 
 
The raid on Beirut  
 
Corsairing continued over the following years, but the most dramatic incident came in 1826. 
On the evening of 18 March, the residents of Beirut were, as the English traveller John 
Madox related, ‘rather surprised at the sight of thirteen Greek ships, gliding quietly through 
the moonlight with a favourable breeze, and coming to anchor in the roadstead, about a 
mile below the town.’44 The authorities of Beirut, though badly provided with munitions, 
rushed to prepare a defence. Before dawn on 19 March, 500 Greeks dressed in Albanian 
costume landed, set up ladders and scaled the outer wall. Cries of alarm and musket-fire 
rang through the city: a few of the attackers were killed, and some of the defenders, but the 
 
37 Dupont to Montmorency, 31 January 1823, AE 42CCC/1. A fortnight later, in another bold feat, corsairs off 
Tripoli carried away the artillery that Ottoman authorities had placed on the coast to repel them. Desrivaux to 
Montmorency, 15 February 1823, AE 346CCC/17. 
38 Regnault thought that Orthodox Christians of Tripoli had fled in part because they feared reprisals for corsair 
raids: Regnault to Latour-Maubourg, 9 February 1822, CADN 92PO/A/6. 
39 See Asad Rustum, Bashīr bayna al-Sultān wa-l-ʿAzīz, 1804-1841 (Beirut: al-Jāmiʿa al-Lubnāniyya, 1956), 33-
37. 
40 Desrivaux to Montmorency, 28 February 1823, AE 346CCC/17. The British consul at Beirut also reported a 
prize with cannonballs being unloaded at Acre: Abbott to Strangford, 26 March 1823 (FO78/115), in Prousis, 
Rebellion, Unrest, Calamity, 202-4. 
41 For estimates ranging from 4000 to 6000 besiegers, and 1000 defenders, see Desrivaux to Montmorency, 24 
September 1822, AE 346CCC/17; Rustum, Bashīr bayna al-Sultān wa-l-ʿAzīz, 37. The Ottoman force that 
attacked the Greeks from the east in July was only 13,000: Gallant, Edinburgh History, 284 (ebook), though St 
Clair says over 20,000 gathered at Larissa: That Greece Might Still Be Free, 103. 
42 Desrivaux to Montmorency, 24 September 1822, AE 346CCC/17. 
43 Desrivaux to Montmorency, 2 May 1823, AE 346CCC/17; Rustum, Bashīr bayna al-Sultān wa-l-ʿAzīz, 39. 
44 John Madox, Excursions in the Holy Land, Egypt, Nubia, Syria, &c (London: Bentley, 1834), 344. 
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Greeks withdrew beyond the walls. Only at this point did the Greek brigs approach and 
bombard the city, though impeded by a strong wind.45 Badly-aimed cannon-balls whistled 
over Beirut, one taking off the legs of ‘a poor Greek lad in the city’; several of the defenders 
were killed when one of their guns exploded.46 The ships also lost some men, and soon 
retired to their anchorage.  
 
The Greeks who had landed withdrew into the countryside around Beirut, pillaging the 
houses there. They took over a ruined tower halfway between the city and the anchorage, 
and there sat out the next three days. The Muslims of Beirut, meanwhile, put their defences 
in order.47 The city’s Orthodox Christians took refuge in the consulates, while many people 
living in the environs fled into the mountains.48 Some took refuge in the house of the 
American missionary William Goodell, where they only had to put up with him reading the 
Scriptures to them.49 Emir Bashir Shihabi had been alerted to the events: he sent his son 
Khalil and some servants to the outskirts of Beirut, and wrote to the elite of Mount Lebanon 
to assemble there with their men. They did so, along with Emir Bashir himself, on 22 
March.50 According to Lebanese chronicler Tannus al-Shidyaq, Beirutis came to welcome 
him, ‘praising his zeal and courage’.51 But as it appeared to Goodell, ‘whether he will assist 
the Greeks or the Turks, or attempt to become master of the city himself in opposition to 
both, is a perfect mystery.’52 
 
On the morning of 23 March, Goodell relates, ‘All the Greek vessels spread their sails […] 
before sun rise, & with a very light breeze moved out of the river. All eyes were fastened 
upon them. The Turks were at their posts, preparing for victory or death. And a most 
solemn silence prevailed. The Greeks passed the city at a respectful distance without 
throwing a single ball. Just at this time a large number of troops arrived from the Pasha of 
Acre, consisting chiefly of Albanians and Bedowins.’53 Tannus al-Shidyaq thought that the 
Greeks decided to leave because of the appearance of this force, led by the Pasha’s 
chancellor.54 Another Lebanese chronicler wrote that the victory was rightfully claimed by 
Emir Bashir, as he had agreed with Beirut’s notables to attack the Greeks and they had fled 
before him.55 In fact, there was a little more to it than that. 
 
The French consul Henri Guys got an inkling of what had occurred, by way of a Maltese 
fisherman who lived near the tower the Greeks had used as their base. During the night of 
20 March, the fisherman told Guys, he had been approached by several of the chief Greeks, 
and three Orthodox priests. They tried to induce him to take a letter, written in Greek and 
 
45 Guys to Guilleminot, 28 March 1826, AE 346CCC/17; Goodell to Evarts, 9 April 1826 (with journal excerpts 
from 19 March to 4 April), Houghton Library, Harvard, ABC16.6.2 (microfilm 514); Barker to Stratford Canning, 
9 April 1826 (FO 352/12A), in Theophilus Prousis, ‘Bedlam in Beirut: A British Perspective in 1826’, Chronos 15 
(2007): 89-106. 
46 Goodell to Evarts, 9 April 1826; Madox, Excursions, 345-6; Shihābī, Lubnān, 780. 
47 Guys to Guilleminot, 28 March 1826; Barker to Stratford Canning, 9 April 1826. 
48 Madox, Excursions, 346. 
49 Goodell to Evarts, 9 April 1826. 
50 Madox, Excursions, 347. 
51 Ṭannūs al-Shidyāq, Kitāb akhbār al-aʿyān fī Jabal Lubnān (Beirut: al-Jāmiʿa al-Lubnāniyya, 1970), 438. 
52 Goodell to Evarts, 9 April 1826. 
53 Goodell to Evarts, 9 April 1826. 
54 Shidyāq, Akhbār al-aʿyān, 439. 
55 Shihābī, Lubnān, 780. 
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Arabic, to Emir Bashir. In this ‘they told him that they had come to help him to shake off the 
Turkish yoke, and that they would restore Beirut and the coastal towns to him, if he would 
lend them his aid in executing their plan.’ (ils lui disaient qu’ils étaient venus pour l’aider a 
secouer le joug des Turcs et qu’ils lui remettraient Beyrout ainsi que les villes de la côte, s’il 
voulait leur prêter son secours dans l’exécution de leur projet.) The Maltese pleaded 
ignorance of the terrain, and a local man took the letter – a lucky escape for the fisherman, 
as the Emir’s response was to bastinado the messenger.56 As Guys reported, ‘The Greeks, 
displeased at Emir Bashir’s reply, left hastily’ on the afternoon of 23 March (Les grecs 
mécontens de la Réponse de l’Emir Bechir sont partis précipitamment).57 
 
Emir Bashir thus rebuffed the Greeks rudely enough, but he was clearly not trusted by the 
Ottoman authorities either. Madox thought that Abdallah Pasha’s chancellor had been sent 
‘quite as much with the view of watching the Emir, as of repelling the enemy.’58 Whether he 
suspected Bashir of actual coordination with the Greeks or merely of taking advantage of 
the situation, he allowed none of the Emir’s men to enter Beirut. He also took reprisals, 
apparently urged on by local Muslims: Christian merchants of the city were once again 
imprisoned and made to pay large fines, and many fled to the Mountain.59 Emir Bashir soon 
withdrew with his troops to the Mountain, but he interceded with Abdallah Pasha to have 
the Beiruti merchants released, or allowed to return safely, and their goods restored. 
Abdallah seems to have been keen for the city (his tax-farm) to return to business as usual – 
‘for every piastre that is delayed from these revenues’, he reminded his chancellor, ‘the 
delay affects the interest of my treasury’ (kull qirsh taʾakhkara min hādhihi al-aghlāl fa-
taʾkhīru-hu ʿāyid alā maṣlaḥat khizānati-nā). 60 He was willing enough to accept that the 
Christians had fled simply in ‘fear’ (khawf) and ‘affliction’ (iʿtirā), rather than through 
complicity with the ‘scoundrelly Greek unbelievers’ (al-kufarā al-Arwām al-khāsirīn).61 
Abdallah had perhaps learnt from his earlier reprisals against Christians that it was not wise 
to go too far: he might make a short-term gain via fines and seizures, but if too many 
merchants were ruined or fled he would destroy his own tax base. 
 
 
The Emir and the Greeks 
 
As the Maltese fisherman’s tale suggests, though, there was a little more to the affair of 
March 1826 than a simple pirate raid. Behind it lies a shadowy history of negotiations 
between Emir Bashir and the Greek rebels, stretching back to before the outbreak of the 
rebellion in 1821.62 These were conducted initially through the agency of one Hadjistathis 
Rezis, described in Greek sources as a Macedonian merchant resident in Mount Lebanon, 
 
56 Guys to Guilleminot, 28 March 1826; Barker to Stratford Canning, 9 April 1826. 
57 Guys to Guilleminot, 4 April 1826; see also Guys to Guilleminot, 28 March 1826. According to the Maltese, 
the Greek force was about 1500 strong and had with it two French officers, one of whom the Greeks 
addressed as ‘Colonel’. 
58 Madox, Excursions, 347. 
59 Goodell to Evarts, 9 April 1826; Guys to Guilleminot, 28 March 1826; Madox, Excursions, 348-9. 
60 Abdallah’s order to his chancellor, 3 Shawwāl [1241] (11 May 1826), in Shihābī, Lubnān, 782. 
61 Abdallah’s proclamation to ‘all the dhimmī merchants who have left Beirut’ (al-khawājāt al-dhimmiyyūn al-
nāziḥīn min Bayrūt bi-wajh al-ʿumūm), 13 Ramaḍān 1241 (21 April 1826), in Shihābī, Lubnān, 781. 
62 These contacts were uncovered by Protopsaltis, and further explored by Loukatos; my account is based on 
the documents they published. My thanks to Antonis Leontiou for his help in translating these texts. 
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friendly with Emir Bashir, and a member of the Filiki Etairia.63 Rezis had apparently been in 
Odessa before the start of the rebellion, and visited the Greek leader Alexandros Ypsilantis 
with Bashir’s proposals for joint action.64  This was presumably at some point between 
Ypsilantis’s arrival at Odessa in summer 1820 and his crossing of the Pruth in March 1821, 
which initiated the uprising. He was then trying to gain the support of potentates across the 
Balkans, who ruled (partially) Christian populations: Ali Pasha of Yannina, leaders in Serbia, 
Moldavia, Wallachia, and Romania.65 Emir Bashir of Lebanon, the Christian ruler of a partly 
Christian domain, doubtless fitted the pattern. The project seems to have got nowhere, 
however, by the time Ypsilantis crossed the Pruth, and he was in any case defeated and in 
an Austrian gaol by July 1821.66 Meanwhile Emir Bashir, as we have seen, was having 
troubles of his own: he was in exile in the Hawran in spring-summer 1821, and in Egypt from 
summer 1822 to May 1823. 
 
Soon after his return to Mount Lebanon in 1823, however, Bashir tried to re-establish 
contact with Rezis and the Greek authorities. He dispatched letters to them by a Greek 
merchant travelling from Damascus, who arrived in Samos in August 1823 – but they were 
then lost when the boat carrying them from Samos capsized.67 By the summer of 1824, 
Rezis, whether in contact with Bashir or not, was in Nafplion urging the Greek authorities 
there to support plans for an uprising in Mount Lebanon.68 The Greek leaders were 
uninterested at first, but paid more attention in the spring of 1825. This was doubtless 
because Egyptian troops under Ibrahim Pasha, Mehmed Ali’s son, had landed in the Morea 
in February and were pressing Greek forces hard.69 Mehmed Ali was known to covet Syria, 
and it was said that an operation there would divert his attention.70 The man arguing this 
most forcefully was by now the Cypriot captain Charalambos Malis.71 His visions of a pan-
Ottoman rising were almost as expansive as Shelley’s. Rebellions in both Cyprus and Mount 
Lebanon would enable the Greeks to take Crete; the Greeks should aim at fomenting revolt 
not just throughout Syria, but also in Serbia and Wallachia-Moldavia.72 The Administration 
(Διοίκησης) finally approved a Lebanon plan in April 1825, and in July sent Rezis, Malis, and 
Bishop Eudokiados Gregorios to Mount Lebanon, to gather information and negotiate with 
 
63 For these details, Protopsaltis cites Rezis’ file in the Archive of the Fighters, Greek National Library: 243, n. 2. 
64 The only evidence for this comes in a later letter from Alexandros’ brother Dimitrios Ypsilantis to Emir 
Bashir, 15 June 1825, in Protopsaltis, 258-9. This refers to Bashir’s ‘lofty and philanthropic aims’ (τους 
υψηλους και φιλανθρώπους σκοπους), which Rezis had communicated to Alexandros in Odessa ‘before the 
Greeks took up arms’. 
65 Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821-1833 (London: B. T. Batsford, 1973), 52-55; 
Richard Stites, The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 198-200. 
66 Stites, The Four Horsemen, 200-208; Dakin, The Greek Struggle, 61. 
67 See a later report read to the Greek Parliament, 1 April 1825, in Protopsaltis, 245-6. 
68 See Protopsaltis, 243-4; Rezis to Georgios Kountouriotis, President of the Executive (Εκτελεστικός), 1 August 
1824; Rezis to the Supreme Administration (υπερτάτης Διοίκησης), 13 August 1824, in Loukatos, 379-81. 
69 The Syrian coast had been affected by the war preparations, with Mehmed Ali requisitioning ships and 
requesting troops from Abdallah Pasha and Emir Bashir (though the latter’s troops were not in the event 
required). Guys to Chateaubriand, 24 April, 7 May, 17 May, 16 June 1824, 346CCC/17; Rustum, Bashīr bayna 
al-Sultān wa-l-ʿAzīz, 40. 
70 Gallant, Edinburgh History, 323-5 (ebook); Malis to Alexandros Mavrokordatos, Secretary-General of the 
Executive, 13 February 1825, in Protopsaltis, 249-50. 
71 Biographical note in Protopsaltis, 249, n. 1. 
72 Malis to Mavrokordatos, 13 and 27 February 1825, in Protopsaltis, 249-52. 
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Emir Bashir.73 They bore letters from the Administration to the Emir, the Orthodox clergy of 
Syria, Cyprus, and elsewhere, and the ‘Community’ (Κοινότητα) of Mount Lebanon, as well 
as one from Dimitrios Ypsilantis to Emir Bashir.74 
 
Little is known about their mission. It seems to have been over by late January 1826, when 
Malis was back in Nafplion75 – but Bishop Gregorios wrote a report, also from Nafplion, as 
late as May 1826, after the raid on Beirut had taken place.76 He said he had travelled around 
Mount Lebanon gathering information on the people and their ‘natural inclination to 
freedom’ (περί της φυσικης κλίσεως των λαων εκείνων εις την ελευθερίαν), before meeting 
Emir Bashir and passing on the government’s letters. Bashir initially received him with a 
‘deadpan’ ([α]νέκφραστος) face, before ‘expressing enthusiasm (έφθασε να εκφωνήση 
ενθουσιων), [saying] what is mine is yours, and what is yours is mine.’ Gregorios does not 
say that Bashir committed himself to anything, but the fact he sheltered fugitives from 
Ottoman justice was encouraging. He suggested sending ‘a few ships, 15 to 20, with 3000 
Greeks’, which might provoke a great rising of the Lebanese, drawing in the people of 
Palestine. He held out the tempting prize of Damascus, ‘the treasury of the whole kingdom’, 
which the Lebanese would easily take. Yet he added that the authorities ‘should not take 
this conclusion to be self-evidently true’ (Το συμπέρασμα τουτο η Σεβ. Επιτροπη ας μη το 
εκλάβη, ειμη ως αξιωματικην αλήθειαν). 
 
Whatever they heard from the three emissaries, early in 1826 the official Greek government 
set the plan aside.77 But at this point it was taken up by a group of Greek chieftains. These 
captains were independent actors in the Greek war – some, like Kolokotronis and Sisinis, 
had been in open rebellion against the government in 1824, before Ibrahim’s invasion of 
1825 drove Greek forces to reunify.78 Those who adopted the Lebanon scheme in 1826 
were lesser-known figures: Hadjimichalis Talianos (or Tailanos), Nikolas Kriezotis, Vassos 
Mavrovouniotis, and Hadjistephanis Voulgaris.79 Malis was dismayed at the prospect of a 
freelance operation, and in January 1826 demanded the Executive prevent the expedition, 
‘not wanting to see the dramas of Chios in other places, and even in my own homeland’ (μη 
επιθυμων να ίδω τα της Χίου δράματα και εισ άλλους τόπους και μάλιστα την πατρίδα 
μου).80 A small armed expedition to Chios in March 1822 had provoked the Ottomans into 
mass killing and enslavement of Greeks; Malis evidently feared a repetition.81 The captains, 
he told the Executive, were only out for their own interests, not those of Greece. 
 
 
73 Protopsaltis, 252-3. Guys also heard that the Greeks had sent an Orthodox priest (‘un Papas’) to try to build 
support: Guys to Guilleminot, 4 April 1826. 
74 See below. 
75 Malis to Parliament (dated from Nafplion), 29 January 1826; see also Talianos to Executive, 31 January 1826: 
Protopsaltis, 263-4, 266. 
76 Gregorios to the Committee of the National Assembly (Σ. Επιτροπή της Εθνικής Συνέλευσεως), 4 May 1826, 
in Protopsaltis, 260-1. 
77 Protopsaltis, 262. 
78 Dakin, The Greek Struggle, 124-5, 130; 161-4. William St Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free: The 
Philhellenes in the War of Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 227-31. 
79 See Protopsaltis, 273. 
80 Malis to Executive, 26 January 1826, in Protopsaltis, 263. 
81 Gallant, Edinburgh History, 290-4 (ebook). 
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But the government had no real control over the chieftains. As related in an anonymous 
contemporary’s account found by Protopsaltis, they gathered fighters on the island of Kea 
from late in 1825, and a force of 2600 in 14 ships, under Captain Apostolis Papa Apostolara 
sailed for Beirut in early March 1826.82 The account goes on to relate the assault on Beirut, 
the retreat to the coastal tower, and contacts with Emir Bashir. The latter, it says, asked for 
the expedition’s documents from the Greek government, and when they could not produce 
these, ordered them to take to their ships at once, before Ottoman troops arrived and 
destroyed them. They accordingly left on 25 March, and (realising Malis’s fears) raided 
Cyprus, as well as the southern coast of Anatolia, on their way home. 83 
 
Exactly what they had hoped for is unclear. It seems unlikely that they shared Malis’s 
grandiose schemes for a Syria-wide uprising. One of the leaders, Talianos, justifying their 
plans to the Executive and Theodoros Kolokotronis in January 1826, denied that they 
planned to attack Cyprus and Asia Minor (where fellow-Greeks lived); rather, the expedition 
would attack enemy provinces, and ‘if it does not force the enemy to withdraw from 
Greece’ (εαν δεν αναγκάση τον εχθρον να αποσυρθη απο την Ελλάδα), would ‘benefit the 
Greeks with the spoils of the enemy’ (τους δε Έλληνας να ωφελήσω με τα λάφυρα των 
εχθρων).84 The Maltese fisherman who met the landing force thought that they aimed to 
pillage the rich merchants of Beirut.85 For minor chieftains shut out from the main rewards 
of the war, a speculative corsairing raid may have looked like their best shot at wealth and 
glory. Their actions at Beirut suggest, though, that they expected aid from Emir Bashir. 
 
What were the prospects of spreading a Greek-style dynamic to Mount Lebanon in the 
1820s? As we have seen, reprisals for the Greek war and corsairing had put strain on 
relations between Muslims and Christians (especially Orthodox), along the Syrian coast. Yet 
this never reached anything like the levels found in the Morea and the islands. The 
Orthodox Christians, besides, were concentrated in the towns under the eye of the Ottoman 
governors, and possessed no military force. The only major independent armed forces were 
under the control of Emir Bashir and others of the Mount Lebanon elite; and Emir Bashir did 
enter into – guarded – negotiations with the Greeks. Had they appeared in sufficient 
strength, and had it suited his interests, he might well have collaborated with them on an 
opportunistic basis – as Abdallah Pasha had done in 1823 when the corsairs resupplied him 
in Acre. The Greeks were keen to impress on him (and other Lebanese) their successes 
against the ‘Satrap of Egypt’: they clearly sensed that potential allies would need to see 
evidence of strength.86  
 
Anything more than a temporary alliance of convenience, though, would have required 
stimulating opinion in Mount Lebanon in favour of the Greek cause. The Greek authorities 
certainly appealed, in their letter, to Emir Bashir’s ‘brave and freedom-loving spirit’ (τα 
γενναια και φιλελεύθερα φρονήματά Σας), inviting him to join an alliance of ‘freedom-
 
82 Protopsaltis, 273. This may be the Psaran Admiral, Nikolis Apostolis: Dakin, The Greek Struggle, 76. 
83 Protopsaltis, 274. 
84 Talianos to Executive and to Kolokotronis, 31 January 1826, in Protopsaltis, 266-8. 
85 Guys to Guilleminot, 4 April 1826. 
86 Administration to Bashir and to Community, 13 July 1825; Ypsilantis to Bashir, 15 June 1825, Protopsaltis, 
255, 256, 259. Cf. Talianos to Kolokotronis, 31 January 1826, Protopsaltis, 267: the previous Greek emissaries 
to Mount Lebanon had failed because ‘the inhabitants there demanded naval power’ (οι εκει κάτοικοι 
εζήτησαν θαλάσσιν δύναμιν). 
 
 13 
loving peoples’ (των φιλελευθέρων λαων).87 Dimitrios Ypsilantis not only urged him to show 
‘your zeal against the tyrant of humanity’ (τον ζηλóν σου εναντίον του τυράννου της 
ανθρωπότητος), but also held out the prospect of his being ‘renowned as the liberator of 
the Holy Places and Jerusalem’ (και να ονομασθης ελευθερωτης τον αγίων τόπων και της 
Ιερουσαλήμ).88 Emir Bashir may have been happy to humour Rezis and others with hints at 
his sympathy – his predecessor Emir Yusuf al-Shihabi had, after all, presented himself as 
longing since childhood for Russian rule, when Orlov’s fleet had occupied Beirut fifty years 
before.89 But with the balance of power as it was, he was far too canny to commit himself. 
 
Others may have been more receptive to Greeks’ or their allies attempts to – as Henri Guys 
put it – ‘create a party for them in the country’ (leur faire un parti dans le pays).90 The 
emissaries of 1825 apparently distributed over 2000 piastres’ worth of gifts throughout 
Syria.91 The Greek authorities addressed letters to other Lebanese notables and ‘to the 
eminent Community of Lebanon’ (Προς την περίβλεπτον Κοινότητα […] του Λιβανίου),92 
writing of ‘the freedom-loving notions of the inhabitants of Lebanon and their decision to 
combat the tyrants, and make triumph the true worship of the immaculate faith, the 
sweetest freedom, and independence’ (τα φιλελεύθερα φρονήματα των κατοίκων του 
Λιβανίου και την απόφασίν των να πολεμήσουν τους τυράννους και να κάμουν να 
θριαμβεύση η αληθης λατρεία της αμωμήτου πίστεως και η γλυκυτάτη ελευθερία και 
ανεξαρτησία).93 It is possible that this rhetoric struck a chord with some (Christian) 
Lebanese. Guys wrote, scornfully, that ‘a few peasants may have said to them [the Greeks]: 
when will you come and deliver us from the tyranny that oppresses us? For they address 
this phrase to all the Europeans or Christians that they see.’ (quelques paysans peuvent leur 
avoir dit: quand viendrez vous nous délivrer de la tirannie qui nous opprime? car ils 
adrèssent cette phrase à tous les Européens ou chretiens qu’ils voyent.)94 The American 
missionary Jonas King claimed to have encountered an important Bedouin who asked, more 
ambiguously, that ‘the English, the French, even the Greeks [might] come to free us from 
such oppression and misery!’ (que les Anglais, les Français, que les Grecs même viennent 
nous affranchir de tant d’oppression et de misère !).95 Abdallah Pasha, for one, had initially 
suspected the Christians of Beirut of ‘intriguing and being in agreement with the rebellious 
unbelievers’ (bi-dasāsati-kum wa-muṭābaqati-kum li-l-kufarā al-khawārij) – though this may 
have been only a pretext for fining them.96 
 
87 Protopsaltis, 255-6. 
88 Protopsaltis, 259. 
89 Du Quenoy, ‘The Russian Occupation of Beirut’, 137. 
90 Guys to Guilleminot, 4 April 1826. 
91 Protopsaltis, 260 (apparently based on Rezis’s financial papers). 
92 Protopsaltis, 254, transcribes: Προς την περίβλεπτον Κοινότητα (έμσεχ εχιλ - τζεμαίκ) του Λιβανίου. The 
sense of the words in brackets is unclear – but they may possibly conceal the Arabic mashāyikh al-jamā ʿa, 
‘shaykhs of the community’. 
93 Administration to Community, Protopsaltis, 254-5; Administration to unnamed Lebanese, 27 and 29 June 
1825, in Loukatos, 387-88. Bashir himself was alert to the possibility: the first thing he asked Gregorios was 
whether he had brought letters for anyone else in his domains. Protopsaltis, 261. 
94 Guys to Guilleminot, 28 March 1826. For ‘de la tirannie qui nous opprime’ he had originally written ‘du joug 
[qui nous] accable’, then crossed it out. 
95 Jonas King, Extraits d’un ouvrage écrit vers la fin de l’année 1826 et au commencement de 1827, sous le titre 
de Coup d’oeil sur la Palestine et la Syrie, accompagné de quelques réflexions sur les missions évangéliques 
(Athens: C. Nicolaidès Philadelphien, 1859), 34. 




One group whom the Greeks certainly tried to involve were the high Orthodox clergy. They 
sent letters – in similar terms to those quoted above – to the hierarchy not just of Syria, but 
also Cyprus.97 Orthodox clergy are included, along with Bashir and others of Mount 
Lebanon’s tax-farming elite, in a list of Lebanese notables preserved in the Greek Executive’s 
files for April 1825.98 But absent both from the list and from the correspondence of the 
Greek authorities are the Maronite Catholic clergy. These were the only Christian clerics 
with real political influence in Mount Lebanon: indeed, Bashir depended on them 
increasingly from 1825.99 Without the involvement of the clergy or other Maronite notables, 
events in Lebanon were unlikely to take a Greek-style turn towards armed conflict between 
Christian and Muslim, or Maronite and Druze. And the Greek rebels had had little success in 
mobilising Catholics, even the Greek-speaking communities of the Archipelago.100 
 
As it was, the pattern of cross-confessional elite bargaining held through the 1820s – 
despite the tensions created by the Greek rebellion, the uprisings of Christian commoners, 
and the growing political importance of the Maronite Church. In entertaining relations with 
the Greek rebels, Emir Bashir was – as usual – hedging his bets carefully, keeping in touch 
with all sides and avoiding a final commitment until the last possible moment.101 When this 
moment arrived, he declared for the Ottomans, perhaps making use of the pretext of the 
Greek raiders’ lack of official support. In this, Bashir was not so very different from other 
quasi-autonomous potentates who became caught up in the dynamic of the Greek war: Ali 
Pasha of Yannina, various Albanian chieftains, or Greek chiefs like Gogos or Odysseas who 
alternated between fighting for the Greeks and coming to arrangements with the 
Ottomans.102 In the remote but conceivable event that European states had become 
involved in the war and the tide turned against the Sultan across the empire, Bashir might 
have made use of his Greek contacts to find new allies. But for the time being, in Syria it 
remained safest to keep in with the Ottoman governors and particularly with Mehmed Ali. 
In Greece, the balance of power was different, and powerful men not dissimilar to Bashir 
made different choices. 
 
 
The ‘Christian Emirate’ 
 
There was, however, a sequel. Greek rebels and other observers of Egypt’s growing 
presence along the Syrian coast during the war had not been mistaken: Mehmed Ali wanted 
the province. In 1831 his army invaded, again under his son Ibrahim, and held Syria for the 
 
97 Administration to Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch and to Cypriot hierarchy, 13 July 1825, in Protopsaltis, 257-
8; circular to hierarchy of Lebanon, 13 July 1825, in Loukatos, 389. 
98 In Loukatos, 385-6. 
99 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon (London: Pluto, 2007), 11. 
100 Charles A. Frazee, ‘The Greek Catholic Islanders and the Revolution of 1821’, East European Quarterly 13, 
no. 3 (1979): 315–326. 
101 For similar situations, see Mishāqa, Murder, Mayhem, 47 (Napoleon and Ottomans, 1799); Rustum, Bashīr 
bayna al-Sultān wa-l-ʿAzīz, 2: 177-8 (Ibrahim Pasha and Ottomans, 1830s); Dimashqī, Tārīkh Ḥawādith al-Shām, 
101-7 (Ibrahim Pasha, British and Ottomans, 1840). 
102 Giannēs Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821-1912 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), ch. 3; George Finlay, A History of Greece: The Greek Revolution, Pt. 1, A.D. 
1821-1827 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1877), 249-50, 265, 271, 306, 380-2. 
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following decade. While the Egyptians attempted to impose a rigorous bureaucratic 
government, the European commercial and diplomatic presence grew apace.103 Ibrahim 
faced rebellion in different parts of Syria, but more importantly the anxieties of the 
European Powers. His defeat of the Ottoman armies in December 1832 at Konya had driven 
Sultan Mahmud to make an alliance with Russia: this the British Foreign Secretary Lord 
Palmerston viewed with great suspicion, as giving Russia access to the eastern 
Mediterranean. Palmerston engineered a diplomatic agreement among the European 
Powers (bar France), and in August-September 1840 intervened to expel Egyptian forces 
from Syria.104  
 
A serious rebellion had broken out in Mount Lebanon earlier in 1840: it had several 
components, but one was a Christian commoner movement recognisably in the tradition of 
the 1821 leagues.105 It issued a proclamation calling on the Lebanese to rise against Egyptian 
‘slavery’: ‘the Greeks,’ it added, ‘rose up before you, and obtained total freedom from 
God.’106 The Christian rebels also attracted support from a few local Europeans: the 
aristocratic French vicomte Onffroy de Thoron, the fiery Polish Jesuit Maximilian Ryllo, a 
Piedmontese said to have been an acrobat performing ‘Hercules’, and the Greek consul at 
Beirut.107 They were inspired by similar sentiments to the philhellenes of twenty years since, 
though with a greater role played by Catholic and Crusading themes. 
 
The French consul Prosper Bourée was also carried away by his sympathies, despite his 
government’s support for Mehmed Ali. He was probably responsible for rendering the 
rebels’ proclamation into French: in this free translation, the Lebanese become ‘Amis de la 
Patrie’, moved by a ‘patriotique appel’ to recover their ‘indépendance’.108 Bourée sent to 
Paris a plan for setting up a Christian emirate in Mount Lebanon, under nominal Ottoman 
suzerainty and French protection – but was immediately recalled to France.109 In the 
meantime, the British and Austrians made their move: they landed arms, troops, and 
money, and most importantly bombarded the Syrian coast, blowing up the supposedly 
impregnable citadel of Acre.110 Mehmed Ali took the point and withdrew his army to Egypt; 
Bashir al-Shihabi, compromised by his association with the Egyptian regime, was packed off 
into exile in Malta. 
 
 
103 Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, 111-2, 116-20, 161-66, 219-20; Chevallier, La société du Mont Liban, 
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Over the following months, as the emirate passed into the hands of his far less capable 
cousin Bashir Qasim, both the Maronite Patriarch and the French government took up 
Bourée’s notion of a Christian emirate. Mount Lebanon’s politics began to polarise between 
Maronites who supported this position, and Druze who refused to concede that the emirate 
was the hereditary property of the Shihabi family. In March 1841, the Patriarch had 
Maronite leaders sign a pact for common action, similar to those made by commoner 
leagues in 1821. In November, Druze leaders besieged Emir Bashir Qasim in his capital, and 
the Patriarch gathered a Maronite army to aid him. But the Maronite alliance soon 
disintegrated: Bashir Qasim too went into exile, and the Shihabi emirate ended.111 Over the 
next decade, its resurrection was the hope and desire of Maronite churchmen and their 
French allies.112 Their propaganda occasionally mentioned the example of the Greeks, but as 
in 1840 its tenor was mainly Catholic, with much emphasis on the perpetual Catholicity of 
the Maronites and their links with Saint Louis, the Crusader King.113  
 
From 1840 onwards, we can thus see what look like symptoms of Shelley’s ‘general fever’ 
appearing faintly in Mount Lebanon, as they had not in 1821. The polarisation of Christian 
against Muslim (or Maronite against Druze); the aspiration to an independent, European-
protected Christian polity; the romantic movement of sympathy among Europeans – all 
these would after henceforth have a place in Lebanese politics. But the symptoms remained 
mild: there was no wholesale massacre of either Druze of Christians, no Muslim-free zone to 
become a homogeneous Christian nation-state, no major European movement in favour of 
the Christian Lebanese. These relative absences may be seen as indices of underlying 
differences between Mount Lebanon and Greece: the lack, in the former, of an 
overwhelming Christian majority, or of major exposure to the politico-military upheavals of 
the Revolutionary wars. But they also reflect the fact that the moment for a Greek-style 
upheaval had passed by 1840. 
 
The Mediterranean was becoming subject to a more stable kind of order, and Palmerston’s 
assertion of British power in that year would set the seal on it. The 1820s and 1830s would 
appear in retrospect an unsettled, transitional time, when the Congress of Vienna 
settlement chafed uneasily against aspirations deriving from the Revolutionary wars. Under 
these conditions, novel political projects could emerge – Greek national independence, 
Mehmed Ali’s modernising state, or indeed philhellenism114 – while features of the pre-
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Napoleonic Mediterranean, like corsairing and warlordry, could also reassert themselves. 
The 1840s, by contrast, would see the consolidation of a more stable and peaceful 
Mediterranean order, of regular steamers and expanding Europe-facing trade, policed by 
British naval power.115 Navarino, in 1827, marked one step towards the entrenchment of 
this order, leading on to the independence of the Greek state and the suppression of 
corsairing. 1840 marked a further step, as Mehmed Ali was confined to Egypt, and Lebanese 
politics subsequently frozen in their complex sectarian form. In the succeeding decades, 
European states continued to jostle for influence, in Mount Lebanon as in the Kingdom of 
Greece, but within the bounds of a reasonably fixed, though negotiable order. 116 While 
European influence expanded apace, Ottoman subjects’ religio-national aspirations 
remained largely confined within the limits of formal Ottoman sovereignty, the Tanzimat 
reforms, and great-power diplomacy.117 The age of instability and possibility that had made 
Greek independence possible had passed – to the particular regret of ambitious Frenchmen. 
 
Another such age would arrive in the wake of the heavy Ottoman defeat by the Russians in 
the war of 1878-79. Sharper religio-national confrontations followed, in a context of 
heightened imperial competition: the 1890s massacres of Armenians, the Balkan Wars, then 
the First World War and Armenian Genocide.118 This new wave of war, revolution, and 
ethno-religious cleansing ultimately swept away the Ottoman empire itself, leaving a new 
crop of independent nation-states across the Balkans and Anatolia; while European powers 
carved up the southern Ottoman provinces. Syria-Lebanon became a French League of 
Nations Mandate in 1923, giving fresh scope to old Franco-Maronite designs: a Christian-
dominated ‘Grand Liban’ was soon definitively hived off from Syria. But this project – like 
others of the period in the southern ex-Ottoman lands – did not take a religiously exclusive 
form.119 The independent Lebanese Republic which emerged from it in 1943 was designed 
as a Christian-dominated entity, but emphatically not a Christian-only one.120 
Multiconfessional power-sharing, not religious homogeneity, would form the basis of its 
national mystique. 
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